#383 The End Of Strategy: Effects-Based Operations (2003) By Alan Stephens
 
Working Paper No. 383
 
Since the end of World War II, the Western way of war has been increasingly characterised by the exploitation of a well-educated population and overwhelming technological superiority, a combination which has facilitated the ability to fight with precision and knowledge, at a distance. The result over the past thirteen years has been a series of remarkably successful theatre-level campaigns. Notwithstanding that success, the Western model remains subject to a number of structural weaknesses, including its cost, a ‘platformcentric’ mentality and organisation, a dependence on legacy systems, and an excessive focus on generating physical (as opposed to cognitive and/or informational) effects. The Australian Defence Force reflects all of those weaknesses, to the extent that it may find the existing model unsustainable. The concept of Effects-Based Operations represents a philosophical response to this problem. Unlike the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs and Network-Centric Warfare, which respectively have been one-dimensional (technology without doctrine) and strategically insufficient (a mere enabling mechanism), EBO establishes a logic flow between Ends, Ways and Means at all levels of strategic thinking. Consequently, it has the potential not only to strengthen the existing model, but also to expand it into a whole-of-nation approach to security. EBO can reinvigorate the West’s greatest asymmetric advantage and represents a rare opportunity for those few nations capable of mastering it.
 
Soft Cover
22 pages
In Good Condition